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Abstract
Industrial development is often accompanied by massive migration from agricultural to
industrial areas. This paper compares two steady states, the first and the second, which
emerge before and after the termination of such migration, respectively. The paper shows
that 1) the employment rate must be lower in the second steady state, and that 2) while
every household increases individual assets in the first steady state, households may
polarise into the poor and the rich in the second steady state. By examining the effects of
fiscal policy, the paper also shows that the balanced budget multiplier exceeds unity, and
accordingly, fiscal policy raises households’ disposable income and consumption.
1. Introduction
Industrial development is often accompanied by massive migration from agricultural to
industrial areas. Figure 1 indicates that this type of migration to the industrial areas
terminated in the early 1970s in Japan. This termination of migration coincided with the
end of that country’s rapid economic growth. Remarkably, the employment rate also
declined after the termination of migration. The first aim of this paper is to provide a simple
framework that is consistent with these phenomena.
The framework that we present is a modified Harrod-Domar model. Although this
model might be regarded as an elementary framework in old textbooks, this paper
demonstrates that it still gives insights into dynamic economies. In his seminal paper,
Harrod (1939) argues that the warranted growth rate does not coincide with the natural rate
of growth.1 Even though the warranted rate exceeds the natural rate, an industrial economy
can grow at the warranted rate so long as large numbers of migrants flow into the industrial
areas. However, once this migration terminates, a discrepancy between the warranted rate
and the natural rate inevitably emerges as an actual disparity requiring resolution.2 The
current paper suggests that in these circumstances, a fall in the employment rate may play a
central role in adjusting the warranted rate of growth.
3Using a model with fixed coefficients, Kaldor (1956) proposes an adjustment
mechanism through income distribution. He argues that the rate of savings is higher out of
profits than out of wages; as a result, the average saving rate positively relates to the profit
share in income. If the profit share moves adequately, the warranted rate becomes equal to
the natural rate through a change in the average savings rate. The adjustment mechanism
proposed by the current paper is similar to Kaldor’s, to the extent that the savings rate is
variable. However, profit share is constant in our model. We emphasise that the
consumption of individual households is not proportional to their income. Accordingly, the
average savings rate of the whole economy decreases with a fall in income per household,
which depends on the employment rate. Thus, a fall in employment rate can reduce the
savings rate, and thereby adjust the warranted rate to the natural rate.
The second aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of individual assets in
industrial development. It is shown that while individual households can continually
increase their assets in the first steady state, households may polarise in the second steady
state; i.e. the rich become richer and the poor become poorer. Stiglitz (1969) used a
neoclassical growth model to prove that a stable steady state has a tendency to distribute all
assets evenly. His model always assumes full employment; therefore, capital accumulation
causes an increase in wage rates and a reduction in interest rates. Both the wage rate
increase and the interest-rate reduction contribute to the equal distribution of assets among
households.3 In contrast, our steady states are characterised by underemployment, and no
guarantee exists of equal distribution.4 In our case, the key to preventing polarisation is to
levy a tax on asset income and redistribute the tax revenue.
Finally, the paper investigates the multiplier effect of government spending in the
circumstance of underemployment. Ono (2011) provides a clear explanation of the balanced
budget multiplier, which is unity in the short run. Our comparative statics show that the
balanced budget multiplier exceeds unity, and accordingly, government spending enhances
households’ disposable income and consumption.
2. The Model
Let us consider a simple model consisting of two economies: an agricultural economy and
an industrial economy. Suppose that each economy is self-sufficient and has no connection
4to the other except with regard to possible migration. Our focus is upon economic growth in
the industrial economy where a market economy prevails. For the agricultural economy, we
assume that local communities guarantee individual households a living standard that
slightly exceeds the subsistence level. When jobs are available in the industrial economy
and the wage rates are more satisfactory than the earnings in the agricultural economy,
migration occurs from the agricultural to the industrial economy. We also assume that one
household has n successors in both economies; consequently, the total population grows at
the gross rate of n.
Households in the industrial economy
Let us specify the behaviour of households living in the industrial economy. Each
household lives for one period. A household indexed by i maximises the following utility
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denotes a transfer from household i to
its successors. Constant c reflects the minimum level of consumption. Each household is
endowed with one unit of labour. In real terms, the budget constraint is given by
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denotes the number of households located in the industrial economy; and x denotes the
employment rate. When the quantity of employed labour is denoted by N, the employment
rate is given by LNx /= .5
As a result of maximisation, the consumption and transfer become
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5Note that owing to c , individual consumption given by (1) is not proportional to income.6
Firms
Let us adopt a familiar monopolistic competition model. Industrial firm j maximises its
profit jjj
WNYP − , subject to the demand function YPPY jj η−= )/( and the labour input
function jj YN τ= , where jP denotes the price of good j; jY the quantity of produced
good j; W the nominal wage rate; jN the employed labour for producing good j; P the
price index; Y the aggregate demand; and τ the labour coefficient.7 As a result of profit
maximisation, the price of good j becomes )1/( −= ητηWP j . In a symmetric equilibrium,
PP
j = (and therefore YY j = ). Thus, we obtain the real wage rate in the industrial
economy:
τθ // =≡ PWw , (3)
where )/)1(( ηηθ −= implies labour share in income.
Furthermore, let us assume that investment 1−tI is planned exactly for realising the
above profit, i.e.
ttt
vYKI ==−1 , where tK denotes the quantity of capital, and v the
capital coefficient. It is assumed that capital depreciates completely in one period.
Lastly, let us assume that firms distribute the whole profit to households, and therefore,
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3. First Steady State with Migration
Now, consider the first stage of industrial development, when an abundant supply of labour
is available through migration from the agricultural economy. We assume that
cww >> . (5)
Wage rate w given by (3) is higher than reservation wage w that is based on earnings in
the agriculture economy. Then, equilibrium employment rate x* would be determined by
the well-known Harris-Todaro mechanism:8
θτ //* wwwx == . (6)
Taking (1) and (6) into account, aggregate consumption is given by
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6Note that the aggregate consumption is proportional to aggregate income, while the
individual consumption given by (1) involves a positive constant c)1( α− .
Now, let us investigate the warranted rate of growth. The goods market equilibrium is
given by
ttt
ICY += . Then, using (7), we have
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where *s denotes the saving rate: ( ))/(1)1(* wcs θα −−= . Then, from (8) and
vKY
tt
/= , we obtain the warranted growth rate:
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Following Harrod, let us assume that this warranted rate is higher than the natural rate
of growth. Since we ignore technical progress, it implies that nvs >/* , i.e.,
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Even if this inequality holds, the industrial economy can grow at the rate of vs /* as long
as the inflow of migrants continues.
4. Second Steady State without Migration
Since nvs >/* , the industrial economy growing at the rate of vs /* will completely
absorb agricultural labour sooner or later. After the agricultural economy disappears, the
industrial economy can grow at the rate of n in the long run. Now, let us examine how the
warranted growth rate can be adjusted to natural rate n.
Let x** denote the employment rate in the second steady state without migration.
Aggregate consumption can be indicated by
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Accordingly, the equilibrium output becomes
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where ( )*)*/(1)1(** xcs τα −−= . Then, from (12) and vKY
tt
/= , the warranted rate of
growth is vsKI /**/ = . However, the growth rate in the steady state is bound to be n, and
therefore it must hold that nvs =/** . This means that x** has to be
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7Comparing (6) and (13) under condition (10), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The employment rate in the second steady state is lower than the
employment rate in the first steady state: x** < x*.
This examination reveals that the warranted growth rate can be adjusted toward the natural
growth rate by a decrease in the employment rate. A fall in output Y raises consumption rate
C/Y )/)1(( YLcαα −+= , and thereby reduces the saving rate. Further, the fall in Y
decreases employment N. Hence, a particular employment rate exists under which
nvs =/** . Note that there is a paradoxical aspect: the higher the growth rate of population,
the higher the employment rate: 0/** >∂∂ nx .
5. Effects of Technical Progress
Let us compare the effects of technical progress in the above two steady states. From (6), (9)
and (13), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: In the first steady state, capital-saving technical progress enhances growth
rate, and labour-saving technical progress reduces the employment rate:
0/)/( <∂∂ vKI , 0/* >∂∂ τx .
In the second steady state, these technical progresses reduce the employment rate:
0/** >∂∂ vx , 0/** >∂∂ τx .
6. Inequality in Individual Households
Behaviour of individual assets
As shown in the Appendix, the dynamics of individual assets is indicated by
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Given (14), let us examine the two steady states.
8Asset dynamics in the first steady state
In the first steady state, (5) and (6) imply that cwx >* . Then, taking (14) into account,
together with the following relationship
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figures 2-1 and 2-2 depict two cases. The criterion dividing the two cases is whether capital
accumulation based on the savings out of profits is faster than population growth. In both
cases, individual asset ib increases over the average asset level: τ/*/ vxLK = . Thus,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Individual assets can continually increase in the first steady state.
Note that new migrants who have no assets come to the industrial economy continually.
Then, the fact that the average asset level is fixed at τ/*vx does not contradict the
continual increase in individual assets.
If θ is relatively low, so that nv >−− /)1)(1( θα , inequality will expand. In order to
confirm this, suppose that household 1i had more assets than household 2i at period t-1:
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Then, according to (14), the difference in transfers received by each successor at period t is
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Thus, asset inequality widens at period t. In contrast, asset inequality decreases if θ is
relatively large, so that nv <−− /)1)(1( θα . Therefore, the difference in asset holdings will
diminish, as shown by (16).
Asset dynamics in the second steady state
Let us examine the second steady state, where **xx
t
= in (14). We have the following
relationship:
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Figure 3-1 draws the case of a small θ , in which nv >−− /)1)(1( θα . In contrast, figure
3-2 draws the case of a large θ , in which nv <−− /)1)(1( θα . The results are summarised
9as follows:
Proposition 4: If labour share in income θ is relatively small, so that nv >−− /)1)(1( θα ,
households polarise into the rich and the poor in the second steady state. Conversely, if
labour share in income θ is relatively large, so that nv <−− /)1)(1( θα , individual assets
converge to a stationary state indicated by
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Note that **b is equal to average asset LK / .
7. Policies in the Second Steady State
Taxation on asset income
First, let us demonstrate that asset-income taxation combined with a lump-sum transfer can
prevent polarisation even though nv >−− /)1)(1( θα or equivalently
1/)1)(1( >−−≡ vnR θα .
Let z denote the tax rate on asset-income and T be the lump-sum transfer. The balanced
budget implies
v
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Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5: When labour-share θ is small, so that 1/)1)(1( >−−≡ vnR θα , the
polarisation of households is avoided if the tax rate on asset-income satisfies
RRz /)1( −> . (20)
Note that, due to linear consumption and saving functions, this redistribution policy does
not affect macroeconomic performance.9
Government spending
10
Secondly, we investigate how government spending affects macroeconomic performance.
Let g denote per capita government spending. Aggregate spending G is given by gLG = ,
and the goods market equilibrium is indicated by GICY ++= . We examine a simple
balanced budget policy, i.e. the government levies a lump-sum tax g on each household.
Then, instead of (11), aggregate consumption is
tttt
LcgLYC )1( ααα −+−= . (21)
Taking (21) into account, we can derive the following employment rate in the second steady
state:
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which means that government spending g raises the employment rate through its
demand-expansion effect.
Per capita output y is given by
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Note that 1)1/()1(/ >−−−=∂∂ vngy αα : the balanced budget multiplier exceeds unity.
This is because government spending enhances investment as well as consumption in the
steady state. Defining per capita disposable income as gyy −≡~ , we have
01//~ >−∂∂=∂∂ gygy . Thus, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 6: The balanced budget multiplier is greater than unity. Accordingly,
government spending increases households’ disposable income and consumption.
8. Conclusion
By taking into account individual consumption that is not proportional to income, the
current paper examines two steady states: one is characterised by a high employment rate
accompanied by rapid economic growth with migration; the other is characterised by a
lower employment rate accompanied by slower economic growth without migration.10 In
the first steady state, every household can increase individual assets, whereas in the second
steady state, polarisation among individual households may occur. In order to avoid
polarisation, labour share in income has to be relatively high. In other words, the product of
11
wage and employment rate must be large enough to afford minimum consumption. When
these conditions do not hold, taxation on asset-income, combined with a lump-sum transfer,
becomes an adequate scheme for avoiding polarisation.
Since insufficient demand for goods restricts the economy in the second steady state, it
might not be surprising that Keynesian fiscal policy improves the situation. However, it
would be worth noting that the balanced budget multiplier exceeds unity in the second
steady state.
Appendix
Derivation of (14)
From (1), (2), (4), and 111 −−− += ttt ICY , we can confirm that
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When capital K completely depreciates in one period, we have
1−= tt IK . (A-2)
Further, the total amount of transfers received by generation t must be equal to the total
amount of transfers supplied by generation t-1:
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From (A-1)-(A-3), we have the asset income of household i given by
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Let us assume that household i divides i
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equally to its successors so that
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Then, from (2) and (A-4), we have
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FIGURE 1
Net migration to Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya areas (three large industrial areas in Japan),
and employment rates in these areas. Source: Report on Internal Migration, and Population
Census, Statistics Bureau, Japan.
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Notes
1 The former is the rate that warrants the full utilisation of capital, and the latter is the
sum of the growth rates of the working population and labour productivity.
2 Although one of Harrod’s points of emphasis is premised on the instability of warranted
growth, the current paper focuses on another issue: the discrepancy between the
warranted rate and the natural rate of growth. Domar’s (1946) main interest seems to be
in characterising the warranted rate rather than the discrepancy between the warranted
rate and the natural rate of growth.
3 The same mechanism works for equal distribution in Galor and Moav (2004).
4 Extending Stiglitz’ model to the case of a non-linear saving function, Bourguignon (1981)
examines unegalitarian steady states under full employment.
5 To simplify the analysis, we assume underemployment instead of unemployment.
6 The transfer implies savings, and owing to
c
, the saving function becomes convex with
respect to income. Recently, Moav (2002), Galor and Moav (2004), and Nakajima and
Nakamura (2009) adopt similar saving functions.
7 The derivation of the demand function is roughly explained as follows. Let ic denote the
consumption index of household i, which is given by )1/(
1
0
/)1(
)( −
−
∫= ηη
ηη
djcc
iji . Then, from
optimisation, the demand for good j, ij
c
, is derived as ijij
cPPc
η−= )/( , where
)1/(11
0
1
)( η
η −−∫= djPP j . In a similar way, let kI denote the investment index of firm k,
which is given by )1/(
1
0
/)1(
)( −
−
∫= ηη
ηη
djII
kjk . Then, the demand for good j, kjI , is derived
as kjkj
IPPI
η−= )/( . Aggregating these results, we obtain demand function
YPPY
jj η−= )/( . For instance, see Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
8 See Harris and Todaro (1970).
9 Stiglitz (1969) points out this neutrality.
10 We only compare two steady states in which capital is fully utilised. The actual process
of transition may include trial and error in investment. Then, excessive holdings of
capital will occur temporarily. However, if a representative firm decides on investment
with perfect foresight, the economy will quickly attain the second steady state.
